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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a systematic analysis of the purchasing power parity
hypothesis (PPP). This hypothesis states that the exchange rate is equal
to the ratio of the domestic price level to the foreign price level. It has
recently been argued that PPP performs poorly in the 1970s. This paper exam-
ines several possible explanations for this poor performance. We examine PPP
in. the l920s and the 1970s, using monthly and quarterly data, to see if the
relationship has changed over time. We also examine PPP in a multi—exchange
rate world, allowing a quite general error process so as to allow deviations
from PpP to be autocorrelated and correlated across currencies. We are then
able to examine the degree to which the world has become more interdependent.
We also provide evidence that deviations from PPP may follow a random walk.
Finally, the role of the U.S. dollar as base currency is examined. We find,
in general, that PPP holds quite well as a long run proposition, but the






This paper presents a systematic empiricalanalysis of the purchasing
power parity hypothesis (PPp). This hypothesis states thatthe exchange rate
is equal to the ratio of the domesticprice level to the foreign price
level. A major puzzle is why PPPappears to perform poorly in the l97Os, yet
performs well in the 1920s.
Purchasing power parity is a major building block ofmonetary models of
exchange rate determination (see, for example, theessays in Frenkel and
Johnson (1978)). The poor performance of PPPhas led Dornbusch to conclude
that there is "little doubt that themonetary approach to exchange rate
determination ...is an unsatisfactorytheory of exchange rate determination"
(Dornbusch (1980), p. 151). In thispaper, it will be argued that this
assertion is misleading. It is true thatconventional estimation of monetary
models may be unsatisfactory, but estimationbased on a slightly more general
statement of PPP may be satisfactory.
There are several possible explanations forthe failure of PPP in the
l970s that should be considered.First, to examine exchange rate behavior in
a multi—exchange rate world, we shoulduse multilateral exchange rate models
rather than bilateral models. We shallcompare the PPP relation in the 1970s
to that in the 1920s. To the extent that theworld economy is more
interdependent in the l970s than in the 1920s, thisshould improve our ability
to explain exchange rate behavior. Inaddition, we have a method for
determining the degree to which the world has becomemore Interdependent: what
has happened to the correlation betweenexchange rate movements? Second, it
can be shom that a greater degree ofcapital mobility will imply that
deviations from PPp approximately followa random walk. We find that all
exchange rates examined in the 1970s followa random walk, while some exchange3
rates in the 1920s do not. This observation also supports the hypothesis of
greater interdependence.
Several recent studies have found deviations from PPP to be large and
persistent. For example, Frenkel (1981) finds that he cannot reject the
hypothesis that deviations from PPP are a random walk. Darby (1981, p.9)
finds that deviations from PPP follow "a random walk with perhaps a moving—
average adjustment process added." Dornbusch (1980, p.46) states that "the
short term exchange rate deviate(s) from a PPP path, but there are also
cumulatve deviatIons from that path that show substantial peristence."
However, all these studies examine exchange rates in a bilateral world, rather
than a multilateral world.
tn trying to document and explain this puzzle, we shall focus on several
aspects of the PPP relationship. In particular, we shall examine PPP along 3
dimensions. First, we shall look at the PPP relationship in two time periods:
the 1970s and the l920s. Second, we shall use two time intervals: monthly and
quarterly data in the 1970s (and monthly data in the 1920s). Third, we shall
examine PPP country by country and several countries jointly. Such a
procedure will enable us to examine exchange rate behavior in a multicountry
foreign exchange market.
In section II we look at some simple, single country estimation
results. This section provides the evidence for the observation that PPP
fails in the 1970s. In section III, we estimate the PPP relationship for
several countries simultaneously, assuming a quite general error process.
This section allows us to document the degree of interdependence in the 1920s
and the 1970s. In Section IV, we consider the extent to which increased
capital mobility has led to deviations from PPP following a random walk.
Section V inquires into the role played by the U.S. dollar as the base4
currency. Finally, section VI will discuss and summarize the main results to
be drawn from this study.
The PPP relationship to be studied can be written as:
£nS =a.+ + (1)
S1 =domestic(U.S.) price of currency i
=U.S.price level
=pricelevel in country i
Most studies of equation (1) focus on bilateral estimation,regressing the
U.S. price of the DM on the ratio of U.S. to German price levels. In this
paper, we shall estimate equation (1) for several exchange rates (relative to
the dollar) simultaneously. That is, we shall examine equation (1) ina time
series—cross section framework. The greater cross—sectional variation in the
data will allow for more precise estimation of a. and 3.
As stated earlier, we shall use monthly and quarterly data for the 1970s
(June 1973 to December 1979) and the 1920s (January 1921 to May 1925). For
the 1970s, we begin with seven countries: the United Kingdom (ENG), France
(FRA), Germany (GER), Italy (ITA), Sweden (SWE), Canada (CAN) and Japan (JPN).
(See the Data Appendix for more details.) For the 1920s, we focuson five
countries: the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Sweden and Japan. We leave
Germany out of this sample due to the hyperinflation. To compare the results
from the l920s to the 1970s, we restrict our attention, formonthly J=t, Lu
the same five countries. For quarterly data, we examine a different subset of
countries: the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden and Canada. For future refer—
ence, the three subsets of countries used are:5
Q—1970 = UnitedKingdom, Germany, Sweden, Canada.
1973111 to 19791V
M—1970 = UnitedKingdom, France, Italy, Sweden, Japan.
June 1973 to December 1979
M—1920 = UnitedKingdom, France, Italy, Sweden, Japan.
January 1921 to May 1925
II. Single Country Estimation of PPP.
This section examines the PPP relationship in a bilateral world. That
is, we look at equation (1), for, say, the U.K. and Germany, but ignore any
interaction between these two exchange rates. This is the approach generally
used in the literature, and will serve as a summary of the bilateral evidence
on PPP. We first estimate, for each of several countries, the following
regression equation by OLSQ:
nS = +ln(P/P.) + u (1)
Next, we
assume u. is AR(1):
it
=u1+ c (2)
We then estimate (1) and (2) by a Cochrane—Orcutt (CORC) procedure. Finally,
we recognize that prices and exchange rates may be simultaneously determined,
and so we estimate (1) and (2) using instrumental variables (FAIR). For
instruments, we use a constant, time, time squared, lagged prices and lagged6
exchange rates. The results are reported in Table 1. For quarterly data in
the 1970s, we see that the OLSQ results indicate that PPP does nothold very
well —theestimates of 8 range from —0.162 (France) to 2.489 (Canada). The
use of an AR(1) correction (CORC) leads to some improvement, but the results
are still negative. Finally, estimating (1) and (2) using instrumental
variables (FAIR) yields slightly better results, 8ranges from —1.9 (France)
to 2.13 (Germany). In all cases, the estimates of p aresignificantly
positive. The estimate of pranges from about .46 (Germany and Sweden) to
1.001 (Canada). We now see the reason for Dornbusch (1980,p.151) to state
that the "key link between the exchange rate and PPP failsto hold."
We next examine the PPP relationship in the 1970susing monthly data.
The evidence is again weak, and independent of the estimationprocedure
(OLSQ,CORC,FAIR). If we adopt an asset view of exchangerates, then
The exchange is never ascertained
by estimating the comparative value of
money in corn, cloth or any commodity
whatever but by estimating the value of
the currency of one country, in the currency
of another (Ricardo (1821), p. 128 as quoted
in Frenkel and Johnson (1978), p. 5).
That is, aggregate price levels act as aproxy for monetary condition in the
two countries. Since evidence on money demand functions indicates thatthe
relation between prices and money may not be stable formonthly data, the fact
that the PPP relation does not hold well for monthly datamay not be
surprising.
Finally, we estimated equation (1) for the 1920s, using monthly data.
The results (using FAIR's method) indicate that PPP heldreasonabily well
during the 1920s. The exceptions are Italy, Sweden and Japan. The result for
Italy is unusual, in that the point estimates of c, 8 and pare quite
different (although maybe not significantly so) when the estimatesby OLSQ or7
CORC are compared to the estimates by FAIR. Einzig (1937) indicatesthat the
financial market in Italy was not very well developed (p. 295) andthat "While
there was excessive optimism about the prospects of the Italianexchange,
there was excessive pessimism about the internal political andeconomic
conditions" (p. 297). Japan may be explained by its relativeisolation during
the 1920s. Also the l920s were a period of rapidgrowth for Japan: between
1919 (a peak year) and 1931 (a tough year), GD?grew 2.3% per year, exports
grew 5.8% per year and world trade grew 2.7% per year (Shionoya and Yamozawa
(1973), p. 517). Most of Japans trade was with Asia (41% of its 1919
exports), North America (44% of its 1919 exports) and little of itstrade was
with Europe (10% of its 1919 exports) (Ohkawa andRosovsky (1973), p. 191).
In addition, there was also a large earthquakeon September 1, 1923 (Tinbergen
(1934), P. 127 and Einzig (1937), P. 208), thatmay have led to "unusually"
large deviations from PPP.
In conclusion, we find that PPP holds reasonablyye.l'l in the 1920s (even
for monthly data) and not so well for the l970s. In thenext three sections
we will examine various hypotheses to explain these results.
Eli Multicountry Estimation of PPP.
A. Description of the General Estimating Equation.
In this section, we consider again equation (1), but considerestimation
procedures for a multicountry foreign exchange market. That is,we use a time
series—cross section estimation procedure. We assumeequations (1) and (2)
hold for each country, but we allow the errors to becorrelated across
countries. The general idea is that if there is a shock to theGerman—U.S.
exchange rate (so as to cause a positive deviation from PPP) then there will
likely be a (positive) shock to the French—U.S. exchange rate. This8
correlation may arise for any of seveal reasons. First, theremay be a world
shock that effects all exchange rates, such as a world—widerecession.
Alternatively, there could be a shock in Germany that is then transmittedto
France and so effects both exchange rates. Finally, since allexchange rates
are relative to the dollar, any shock in the U.S. will affect allexchange
rates. Consider, for example, an unexpected increase in German realincome.
This will tend to appreciate the Deutsche Mark. If German andSwiss real
income innovations are positively correlated, then we shouldalso see an
appreciation of the Swiss franc. Alternatively, suppose an increase inGerman
real income leads to an increase in demand for Deutsche Marksand Swiss
francs. Then we would expect to observe both the Deutsche Markand Swiss
franc appreciate. That is, an (unexpected) increase in thedollar/Deutsche
Mark exchange rate conveys useful information about thedollar/Swiss franc
exchange rate that is ignored in single exchange rate estimationprocedures,
An exact description of the error termuj,in equation (1) is given
below.
EU =o1.(heteroskedasticity) (3a)
EUitU.t ij (mutual correlation) (3b)
U.p4g.+ c (autoregression) (3c) .itC1t_iN(Oi ) it ' ,'yii
Eu c .=0 (3d)
Ec c.= itJt ii
Ecjc. =0(t￿s)9
Equation (3a) allows the variances of the residuals to differ between
countries; (3b) allows the residuals to be correlated across countries;(3c)
allows the residuals to be autocorrelated for each country.The estimation
of equations (1) and (3) is described in Kmenta (1971, pp. 512—514). The
procedure employed here is different. Rho—difference equation (1) to obtain
£nS=a(l—p) + 2.n(P /P )—p £n(P/P ) it 1 i t it i t—l i,t—l
flSi,t_i+cit (4)
Equation (4) can then be estimated as a system of N equations (N=4, 5 or 7).
B. Estimation of PPP with a Monetary Model
We first estimate (4) using quarterly data from the l970s, under the
assumption that prices are exogenous. For the sample of all seven currencies,
relative to the U.S. dollar, the results are given in Table 2. We see that
the estimate ofis close to 1 and significant (the t—statistic is 9.6, and
is 1.080, which is only .7 standard deviations from 1.0). The correlation
matrix indicates that the residuals for the European currencies are large and
positive, negative for Canada, and small and positive for Japan. Although the
assumption of exogenous prices is strong, these results are indicative of
those to follow when we relax the assumption of exogenous prices.
The previous estimation procedure assumed that the price ratio,
ln(Pt/Pjt), was exogenous. If this assumption is false, then there is a
simultaneous equation bias. To allow for this situation, we can expand the
model, to allow prices to be endogenous. From monetary theory, the price10
level is determined so as to equate real money demand to real money supply.
Assuming that the demand for money is a function of income and the interest
rate and that income and interest rates are exogenous (exogenous interest
rates will be relaxed) we can express the price level as a function of
exogenous variables. The expanded model we will consider consists of








+ cjTji + i=l,...,5
where Mj,t =moneysupply of country i
=realGNP of country i
=interestrate in country i
i =5denotes the U.S.
In this formulation, there are 29 parameters to estimate
(j1,...,5)). Equations (5a) and (5b) can
be estimated using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). The results
are given in Table 3. The estimate of the PPP slope parameter, ,is1.101,
with a standard error of .108 (t—statistic is 10.19). The money demand Income
elasticity (b1) is positive (and significant) for the U.K., Germany and
Sweden, but is negative, and insignificant, for Canada and the U.S. The money11
demand interest semi—elasticity (cj) is negative for Germany, Canada and the
U.S., but insignificantly positive for the U.K. and Sweden. One difficulty is
that p(U.K.) was (insignificantly) greater than 1.0, which indicates non—
stationarity. Also, except for the U.K., the money demand autoregressive
parameter (v.)issmall, being insignificantly different from 0.0. One
possible explanation is that the serial correlation in money demand functions
is being "picked up" by the autregressive error structure of the PPP equation
(see Rakkio (1982)).
The assumption that interest rates are exogenous will now be relaxed,
since both exchange rates and interest rates are determined in a financial
market. To allow for this possibility, we estimate the PPP equation (1) using
three stage lest squares (3SLS). The instruments are money, money lagged
once, income, income lagged once, lagged exchange rates and lagged prices.
One can think of this as substituting out interest rates in a rational







A difficulty arose in estimating equation (6), When estimating equation
(6) as specified, the system did not converge. All parameters converged,
except the constant for Canada (c4); p(Canada) appreared to converge to 1,
which indicates nonstationarity. To overcome this lack of convergence,12
p(Canada) was constrained to be 0.999. With thisconstraint, the system
converged. The estimates of the parameters did not seem to be seriously
affected by this constraint, howevera4 has a low t—statistic. The results
are:











Swe .510 .846 1.000
Can —.354 —.31+0 —.391 1.000
We see that the estimate of is again close to one, 0.951 with a standard
error of 0.141. The estimates of p are all significantlygreater than 0.
From the correlation matrix we see that the deviations from PPPare highly
correlated (positive for Europe and negative for Canada).
C. Comparison of PPP across Time Intervals and Time Periods.
To compare the performance of PPP across time intervals(monthly versus
quarterly data) and across time periods (the 1970s and the 1920s),we now
reestimate equations (1) and (3). To facilitatecomparison, we estimate (1)
using 3SLS with instruments being a constant, time, time squared andlagged
prices and exchange rates for each model. We also allow a to be different
across countries. The results are given in Table 4 (again, p(Canada)was
constrained to be 0.999).
For quarterly data, all estimates of p are less than1.0, and is
precisely estimated to be .951 with a standard error of .149 (fora t—
statistic of 6.4). However, when we look at the monthly datafor the l970s
(and a different set of countries), the estimate of is low (.409 with a
standard error of.l83). This would seem to indicate that therelationship13
between prices and exchanges is not very close with monthly data, but does
conform to PPP predictions with quarterly data. (This result is similar to
the single equation results.)
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that PPP is a medium to
long run condition. Since the PPP relationship may be viewed as a proxy for
the monetary conditions in a country and, in general, monthly money demand
functions are not stable, one would not expect PPP to hold well using monthly
data. Also, price levels are extremely autocorrelated using monthly data,
while exchange rates, being "auction" prices, are much more volatile. It is
only when we move to quarterly data that we pick up a relation between
exchange rates and prices. One possible method of testing such a possibility
would be to use a band spectrum estimation procedure which would "block out"
short run movements (this is not done due to the simultaneity problem).
The results for the 1920s appear surprising. The estimate of is .578,
with a standard error of .072, significantly different from both 0 and 1. As
stated in section II, this result may be due to the special circumstances of
Italy, Sweden and Japan. If we estimate the PPP relation with only the U.K.
and France, equals 1.075 (standard error =.091). If we then include
Sweden (exclude Italy and Japan), equals 1.064 (standard error.080).
Hence, it appears that the poor result ( =.578)is due to the inclusion
of Italy and Japan. A possible explanation was given in Section II.
We are now in a position to examine the degree of interdependence. As
stated earlier, our measure of interdependence is the correlation of the
country error terms (CORR( )).Thecorrelation matrices corresponding
to Table 4 are given in Table 5. This definition of interdependence reflects
the view that a large correlation implies that deviations from PPP for
different exchange rates arise for the same reason or are transmitted very15
1970s than in the 1920s. This would be consistent with the hypothesis that
shocks in one country are more likely to occur simultaneously in several
countries (or be rapidly transmitted to other countries) in the 1970s than in
the l920s. Second, Japan appears to be more isolated from the rest ofEurope
in the 1920s than in the 1970s, in that the deviations from PPP forJapan were
approximately uncorrelated with the PPP deviations for the other European
countries, whereas the correlation became positive In the l970s. That is,
since the 1920s, the interdependence of Japan and Western Europe has incresed
dramatically.
To summarize this section, by using a time series —crosssection
estimation procedure, with quarterly data, we found that the PPP relation
holds quite well (8is statistically close to 1), although the deviations
from PPP tend to be persistent (pis close to 1). This is in contrast to
the results reported in Section II (using single exchange rate methods)
where 8 ranges from —1.9 to 2.1. The increased precision in estimation
arises from exploiting the cross—sectional variation in the data. The
correlation of the disturbances is quite large and so improves the estimation
of 8. However, the results for the monthly data (in the l970s) indicatethat
PPP does not hold, even though the correlation matrix of the disturbances is
quite large. This seems to indicate that PPP is a long run condition and does
not hold for monthly data. If the relation between money and prices is not
stable using monthly data (perhaps real Income is notexogenous in the short
run), and PPP reflects the underlying monetary conditions, then this result
should not be surprising.14
quickly. In section IV we will consider further evidence concerning
interdependence.
In examining the correlation matrix for Q—1970, we find the correlations
are quite large. The correlation for Sweden and Germany is 85%; this,
however, may only reflect the fact that Sweden and Germany belong to the
snake. However, Germany and the U.K. have a correlation of 66%. It is
interesting to note that the correlation between Canada and the other
countries is negative, and approximately —36%. In addition, the correlations.
are greatest for Germany, indicating Germany's major role in world affairs.
The evidence suggests that a positive PPP deviation for any one of the U.S.—
European exchange rates is likely to be coincident with a positive PPP
deviation for the other European countries, but with a negative PPP deviation
for Canada. It appears, then, that the Canadian exchange rate behavior is
different, in this fundamental way, from European exchange rate behavior. One
possible explanation is that Canada and the U.S. are close, both economically
and geographically, while physically separated from Western Europe. However,
no convincing explanation for Canada's anomalous exchange rate behavior has
yet been found.
In looking at the monthly data for the 1970s, we find the correlations
are still quite large. The correlations with France are the largest (recall
that Germany was not included), while the correlations with Japan are the
smallest (although positive). If we compare these results with the results
from the 1920s, for the same set of countries, we find several interesting
results. First, and most important, is the observation that the correlations
are all much smaller for the 1920s.I interpret this to mean that the degree
of interdependence has increased from the 1920s to the 1970s. That is,
unexpected PPP deviations were much more correlated across countries in the16
IV. Alternative Representations of PPP.
Roll (1979) argues that under certain conditions, deviations fromPPP
should follow a random walk. In terms of equations (1) and(2), if a=O, 3=1
and p=1, then the deviations from PPP(I.nS — willfollow a
random walk. The estimates La section III (estimates ofp close to 1)
indicate that the assumption of deviations from PPP beinga random walk must
be considered.
To see under what conditions the deviations will be a random walk(or
some more complex process (Darby, 1981)), assume that Interest rateparIty
holds:
= —s (7)
where t is the log of the forward rate,Stisthe log of the spot rate and
is the foreign interest rate. If the foreign exchange market Is
efficient, so that we can write =
s.,1 where is the rational
expectation of based on information at time t, we can rewrite (7)as
*e — = s1—s





where rt is the real rate of interest and is the expected rate of
inflation (between t and t+1).Substituting (8) into (71) and rearranging
yields17
* e *e e
r— r= (s÷i— s) + (ir it
Defining =p÷l
—p(p =logof the price level), and rearranging,
we obtain
e e *e * *
Sf1 —t+l+ =stPt + Pt + (r —r
) (10)
Equation (10) implies that if capital markets adjust instantaneously, such
that real interest rates are equalized across countries (except, perhaps, for
a random term), then deviations from PPP will follow a random walk.
Let us define as the deviation from PPP for country i,
it =lnS1
— Totest if it follows a random walk, consider
the following regression:
=a+ b + (i=1, ...N) (11)
If the deviations from PPP follow a random walk, then we should find a0 and
b =1.Testing this hypothesis requires care, since for b =1we are on the
boundary of the permissable (stationary) parameter space. Dickey and Fuller
(1981) give test statistics for a =0and b1 and the empirical distribution
function for these test statistics. Table 6 gives the estimates of a and b
and the relevant test statistic for the null hypothesis that a =0and b =1.
For the 1970s (quarterly and monthly), for all countries, we can not reject
the null hypothesis that deviations from PPP follow a random walk. Note that
if one examined the estimate of f3, and its standard error, one would be
tempted to reject the hypotheses of a random walk for Sweden. However, the18
probability that b < 1, given b1, approaches 68% as the sample sizegets
large (Fuller (1976), P. 370, for the case a0 ).Itis interesting to note
that In the 1920s, the hypothesis that the deviationsfrom PPP are a random
walk can be rejected for both France andItaly. This observation, that PPP
deviations move from a non—random walk toa random walk from the 1920's to the
l970's, indicates a structural change in French and Italianexchange rate
behavior. The explanation for Italymay be a move towards greater capital
market integration (recall Einzig's (1937,p. 295) observation). An
explanation for France is less clear.
At the beginning of this section, we stated thatunder certain conditions
(Interest rate parity, foreign exchange marketefficiency, the Fisher
relationship and rapid capital mobility) we wouldexpect the deviations from
PPP to follow a random walk. The hypothesis ofsimple market efficiency
(s+j =t
)maybe suspect; see, for example, Hakkio (1981a) andHansen and
Hodrick (1980). MIshkin (1981) presents evidence thatIndicates that real
interest rates are not equalized acrosscountries, while the evidence
presented here is consistent with real rates being equalized.One possible
explanation is that the test presented here is notvery powerful (In fact, the
power is unknown).
If the deviations from PPP follow a randomwalk, then it may be





There are several interpretations of equation (12) andiIfwe
assume is white noise, then (12) is a regression of therate of
depreciation on the differential rate of inflation: the relativeversion of19
PPP. Equations (11) and (12) are the same, only if =b=1.Ifone first
differences equation (1), one obtains equatIon (12), with =0and
1.'.=u.—u .Therefore,if one assumes u can be written as
itit lit—i it
+ (P1), one can write it as
(p—i)u. +c...If p < 1 ,estimatingequation (12) by OLSQ is
inappropriate since u 1 and ln(P —iI P. t—i are correlated (if
i,t . t 1,
p0 then is MA(i), with a unit root). If p'4, estimation of (12) by
OSLQ is appropriate. Hence, one can view the results in section III as
estimating ,givenp < 1, while equation (12) estImates ,givenp 1
Table 7 gives estimates of y and using OLSQ; we assume the rates of
inflation can be treated as exogenous. In all cases, the estimate of I is
insignificantly different from zero. The estimates offor the quarterly
1970s data are insignificantly different from 1.0, but also insignificantly
different from zero, except for the United Kingdom. The same results hold for
the other subsets of countries and time periods. The results are similar to
the results in Table 1. In Table 8, we assume that inflation is endogenous
and we estimate the N—equation system (12) using 3SLS, with instruments being
a constant, time, time squared and lagged inflation and rates of
depreciation. In this case, we allow theto be different, but constrain the
to be equal. As canbeseen from comparing Tables 6 and 7, the results are
not very different:is imprecisely estimated, often insignificantly
different from both 0 and 1.
The right hand side of equation (12) is the inflation rate differential,
which we know to be highly autocorrelated, while the left hand side variable,
the rate of exchange depreciation, shows little autocorrelation. In other
words, equation (12) is trying to "explain" a temporally uncorrelated variable
with a temporally correlated variable; a finding ofbetween 0 and 1 should20
not be surprising.
In Table 9, the correlation matrix of residuals from equation (12) are
given. As in Table 5, the correlations are quite large, and negative for
Canada relative to Western Europe, for Q—1970. The correlations are quite
large for monthly data, although the PPP relation does not hold well. For the
1920s, the correlations are smaller, and insignificant for Japan.
V. The DM as the Base Currency.
The last topic to be examined is the role of the U.S. dollar as the base
currency in the exchange rate equation. It may be that most of the deviations
from PPP are a result of movements in the U.S. dollar. If deviations from PPP
arise due to transportation costs, then the deviations would be less among the
European countries. In addition, the structure of tariff barriers may be more
stable among European countries than between the U.S. and European
countries. Finally, the behavior of U.S. prices during the 1970s has been
influenced by the existence of U.S. price controls (andtheir removal).
To examine these possibilities, we reestimate the PPP equation using
Germany as the base currency. We calculated the DM price of, say, the French
franc by using triangular arbitrage: S(DM/fr) =S($/fr)/S($/DM).Denoting the
DM price of currency i by S1 and the German price level by P, we can
consider the following regression equation:
lnS. = + ln(P/P.) + u (13a)
uj = + (13b)
Table 10 reports the results of estimating equation (13), equation by
equation, using 2SLS (FAIRs method). Notice that the results for the U.S.
need not be the same as for Germany in Table 1, due to the simultaneity and21
autoregressive correction (the OLSQ results are, of course, the same).
Several results of interest emerge from Table 19. First, the estimates
ofare close to one, with "small" standard errors. However, the results for
Canada indicate a value oftoo large (= 2.693,standard error =0.354)
and the estimate offor Japan is —3.340, but with a standard error of 3.392,
so that a two standard deviation confidence interval would be (—10.1, 3.4)
(in addition, the R2 for Japan was 0.18). Both these countries are
geographically isolated from Western Europe, and so the transport cost
argument may be able to explain these two results. In addition, the results
when using the U.S. dollar as the base currency were also poor. These results
indicate that part of the explanation for the "failure" of PPP (seen in Table
1) may be due to the use of the U.S. as the base currency. The case of Japan
and Canada would seem to indicate something peculiar to their country, rather
than the foreign exchange market.
In the previous section (Table 4) we estimated the PPP equation jointly
for the U.K., Germany, Sweden and Canada, relative to the U.S. We can
estimate a similar equation (for the U.S., the U.K., Sweden and Canada) using
the DM as the base currency. The result is:
ct(USA) =.763 c(Eng) =1.638 ct(Swe) =—.656 c(Can) —11.028
(.220) (.032) (.396) (11.978)




Instruments were a constant, time, time squared,, lagged exchange rates and
lagged price ratios. Recall that the estimate of ,whenthe U.S. was the
base currency, was 0.951, with a standard error of 0.149 (see Table 4). The22
results are close (within one—half standard deviation). This should not be
surprising, since by estimating all equations jointly we should be reducing
the role played by the dollar. In fact, since the equations with the DM as
the base currency are just a linear combination of the equations with the U.S.
dollar as the base currency, the joint estimation should produce similar
results (the and p. need not be similar due to different base currencies).
We now estimate a PPP equation for Western Europe (theU.K., France,
Italy, and Sweden) and the U.S., relative to Germany. The results are given
in Table 11, section 1. The estimate of ,1.189(standard error of 0.060),
is significantly greater than 1.0, but precisely estimated. To see the role
played by the US, dollar, we next estimated the same equation for Western
Europe (excluding the dollar). The results are given in Table 11, section
II. The results are virtually indistinguishable. Part of the explanation is
that the starting values were equal to the final value when the U.S. was
excluded. This result tends to indicate that the increased precision is due
to the joint estimation, as opposed to the choice of base currency.
VI. Summary and Conclusions.
Using monthly and quarterly data from the 1970s and the 1920s we were
able to examine several explanations for the oft—cited failure of PPP to hold
empirically. The foreign exchange market is a well—functioning market
involved in setting exchange rates for several currencies simultaneously. If
one examines PPP in such a setting, one finds that PPP holds quite well as a
long run proposition. Part of the "failuret' of PPP in the 1970s involved the
finding that the relation between exchange rates and prices was very
imprecise, cross—sectional estimates of range from 0.301 (for Canada) to23
2.087 (for Germany).
By employing a time series—cross section estimation procedure we were
able to precisely estimate (between 0.9 and 1.1, depending on the exact
estimation procedure). The extra precision came from the cross—sectional
variation in the data, but also from exploiting the correlation of errors
between countries. One can view this as a seemingly unrelated regression
procedure in that the regression equations appear unrelated, but are, in fact,
closely related due to the correlation of the disturbances (deviations from
PPP). As is well—known, taking into account such correlation should improve
the efficiency of the estimates —aswas the case in this paper. In fact,
the correlation between country disturbances was quite large.
A precise estimate of ,closeto 1.0, implies that as a long run
proposition, PPP is valid. However, the autoregressive parameters, p ,were
large, which indicates that deviations will tend to persist for a long period
of time. Hence, the conclusion that deviations from PPP are persistent is
correct. However, the conclusion that PPP does not hold well, as a long run
proposition, is incorrect. Further evidence that PPP should be viewed as a
long run proposition arises when estimating a PPP equation with monthly data:
the results indicate that PPP does not hold in the long run (<1). When one
allows for deviations from PPP to be correlated and takes this into account in
the estimation procedure, the evidence (using quarterly data) supports
purchasing power parity.
The implication of this observation is that estimation of a monetary
model of exchange rate determination must allow for short run deviations from
PPP to persist, but in the long run PPP holds (see Hakkio (1981b)). For
efficient estimation, one should estimate several exchange rate equations
simultaneously. An efficient estimation procedure would be as follows.
Specify money demand functions for all N currencies:24
(M/p)D =Lj(yt,ijt,zjt)+ v (14)
where z is a vector of additional explanatory variables and is a serially
correlated error term Cv
=
O.(L)1.ij). Next, specify a long run—short run
PPP relation:
inS =+ln(P/P.)u1 (15a)
u =pu +• (15b) it 1i,t—1 it
wherewe allow the error terms to be correlated.
Letting et =it'"'Nt' C1tCN_1 we can specify that
Eee == (c..) (16)
Then, simultaneous estimation of equations (14) and (15) will allow for
deviations to persist in the short run, but to disappear in the long run.
That is, the conclusion reached by Dornbusch that there is "little doubt that
the monetary approach [to exchange rate determination] ...isan
unsatisfactory theory of exchange rate determination" (Dornbusch (1980), p.
151) appears to be unwarranted.
InsectionIV we found that deviations from PPP mayfollowa random
walk. In terms of section III, this would occur if a 0, 1 and p =1. We
can also derive this observation from the assumptions of an efficient foreign
exchange market, real interest rates being equalized across countries and
interest rate parity. The implication of this finding is that one should
consider estimating exchange rate deprectiation models as opposed to exchange25
rate level models.
Finally, in section V we examined the extent to which using the U.S.
dollar as a base currency affect the results. From the single equation
results, the dollar appeared to play a significant role. However, from the
multi—exchange rate model, the impact of the dollar was not great, as one
might have expected. When PPP is examined for only the European countries,
with the DM s the base currency, the PPP relation holds well.
To conclude, the major finding is that when examining exchange rate
behavior, much more precise statements can be made when models are estimated
using all exchange rates and information simultaneously. Much information is
lost when one ignores the fact that exchange rates are determined in a world
market where exchange rates for several currencies are set simultaneously, so
that movements in the dollar/pound rate contain information for the dollar/DM
rate. When such additional information is used, the relation between prices
and exchange rates is very strong, and conforms to the purchasing power parity
prediction. However, deviations from PPP do tend to persist for long periods
of time, and, in fact, may follow a random walk (and so never return).Data Appendix
The data for the period June 1973 to December 1979was obtained
from the December 1979 and April 1981 InternationalFinancial Statistics
(IFS) tapes. The variables and their IFS codesare given, by country,
in the following table.
Variable
Exchange Interest
Country Rate Income Rate— Money Prices
Canada AE 99A.R 60C 34 64
France AE 64
Germany AE 99A.R 60B 34 64
Italy AE 64
Japan AE 64
Sweden AE 99B.P 61 34 64
United Kingdom AE 99B.P 60C 34 64
United States 99A.R 60C 34 64
where the IFS codes stand for:
AE =endof period exchange rate
99A.R =realGNP, 1975 prices






Monthly data was obtained for the spot exchange rate andprices for the
period January 1921 to May 1925. The three primarysources were Einzig (EIN, 1937),
Tinbergen (TIN, 1934) and various issues of the League of Nations(LON).
For each variable, from EIN or TIN, thesource, page and column number,
respectively, is given.Country Wholesale Price Index Spot Exchange Rate
France TIN, 72—73, 34 EIN, 450—458, 2
Italy LON, Table 10 EIN, 450—458, 4
Japan TIN, 131—132, 13 TIN, 131—132, 12
Sweden TIN, 195—196, 27 TIN, 195—196, 25
United Kingdom TIN, 105—106, 21 EIN, 450—458, 1
United States TIN, 210—211, 28Table 1
Purchasing Power Parity
2,n St = + (P1p) +
Ut
—putl÷
Country Procedure p R2 D.W. ser.
Quarterly Data 1973 III —1979IV
ENG OLSQ .755 .599 .46 .19 .093
(.020) (.132)
CORC 1.307 .972 .979 .90 1.64 .040
(.502) (.470) (.041)
FAIR 1.611 1.454 .977 .89 1.78 .041
(.691) (.850) (.043
FRA OLSQ —1.516 —.162 .01 .41 .068
(.016) (.308)
CORC —1.569—1.312 .795 .64 1.22 .041
(.064) (1.019) (.121)
FAIR —1.601—1.900 .819 .63 1.21 .042
(.080) (1.287) (.115)
GER OLSQ —.887 1.934 .85 .98 .055
(.012) (.163)
CORC —.901 2.069 .396 .91 1.75 .044
(.018) (.215) (.184)
FAIR —.905 2.130 .400 .91 1.77 .044
(.018) (.219)(.1F)—2—
Table 1 (continued)
R2 D.W. ser. Country Procedure p
ITA OLSQ —6.543 .912 .75 .43 .075
(.018) (.107)
CORC —6.644 .345 .818 .89 2.06 .046
(.082) (.363) (.115)
FAIR —6.628 .423 .806 .89 2.05 .046
(.080) (.367) (.118)
SWE OLSQ —1.448 .449 .17 1.12 .046
(.013) (.201)
CORC —1.448 .417 .437 .31 1.56 .043
(.022) .325) (.180)
FAIR —1.454 .297 .447 .31 1.55 .043
(.0.) (.358) (.179)
CAN OLSQ —.019 2.489
- .55 .20 .049
(.011) (.462)
CORC 2.249 1.059 1.002 .92 1.48 .021
(1.853) (.734)
FAIR 2.140 .483 1.003 .92 1.51 .021
(1.52) (.914)—3—
Table 1 (continued)
JPN OLSQ —5.563 .375 .02 .10 .156
(.031) (.620)
CORC —5.471 —.017 •957 .91 .83 .049 (.221) (.535) (.058)
FAIR —5.475 .878 .933 .90 1.00 .051 (.164) (.715) (.072)
Monthly Data June 1973 —December1979
ENG OLSQ .759 .639 .50 .10 .088
(.011) (.073)
CORC .652 —.088 .961 .95 1.78 .028
(.109) (.324) (.031)
FAIR .663 —.030 .958 .95 1.77 .028
(.139) (.605) (.033)
FRA OLSQ —1.516 —.026 .00 .20 .067
(.090) (.175)
CORC -1.544 —.733 .899 .81 2.29 .029
(.045) (.687) (.050)
FAIR —1.571—1.367 .916 .81 2.33 .029
(.057) (.996) (.045)
ITA OLSQ —6.541 .934 .78 .15 .069
(.096) (.057)
CORC —6.558 .764 .932 .97 2.02 .027
(.068) (.289) (.041)
FAIR —6.590 .582 .939 .97 Z.04 .026
(.086) (.374) (.039)—4—
Table 1 (continued)
OLSQ —1.448 .492 .21 .44 .044
(.007) (.109)
CORC —1.458 .289 .786 .69 1.88 .027
(.020) (.279) (.070)
FAIR —1.456 .311 .790 .69 1.91 .027
(.022) (.330) (.069)
JPN OLSQ —5.570 .360 .01 .04 .151
(.018) (.349)
CORC —5.503 .359 .979 .96 1.89 .031
(.171) (.326) (.023)
FAIR —5.506 1.303 .972 .95 1.90 .032
(.140) (.695) (.027)
Monthly Data January 1921 —May1925
ENG OLSQ 1.833 .671 .81 .30 .034
(.025) (.046)
CORC 1.832 .666 .858 .94 1.96 .018
(.074) (.144) (.071)
FAIR 1.946 895 .850 .94 2.06 .018
(.129) (.255) (.073)
FRA OLSQ —1.159 Liii .88 .84 .068
(.081) (.056)
CORC —1.119 1.138 .578 .92 1.76 .056
(.146) (.101) (.113)
FAIR —1.242 1.051 .584 .92 1.76 .056
(.161) (.112) (.113)—5—
Table 1 (continued)
ITA OLSQ —1.535 .895 .13 .92 .110
(.576)(.325)
CORC —1.082 1.145 .505 .39 1.58 .09].
(.775) (.435) (.120)
FAIR —2.655 .261 .526 .34 1.52 .095
(1.740) (.640) (.118)
SWE OLSQ —1.081 .487 .85 .50 .029
(.018) (.029)
CORC —1.298 .054 .895 .93 1.00 .018
(.080) (.149) (.062)
FAIR -1.105 .439 .727 .93 1.02 .019
(.046) (.080) (.095)
JPN OLSQ 3.802 —.034 .00 .06 .084
(.141) (.192)
CORC 3.798 .128 .981 .94 1.24 .020
(.158) (.113) (.027)
FAIR 3.563 —.207 .972 .93 1.25 .022
(.237) (.267) (.033)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ser is the standarderror of the re-
gression. CORC is the Cochrane —Orcuttcorrection procedure for AR(1)
errors. FAIR is Fair's two—stage least squares procedure when theerror
is AR(1) The instruments used were a ionstant, time, timesquared, the
lagged exchange rate and the lagged price ratio.Table 2
ZnS. ct.+Qn(P/P. )+uit it 1 tit




























































Notes: Standard errors are in paranthesess.was constrained to be equal
for all countries.Table 3
Full Information Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Purchasing Power Parity
Quarterly Data 1973 III —1979IV
£nS. = +8&n(Pt /P1) + u.
U.= p•U +c. it 1 1,t—1 it
£nM. —nP.a.+bR..ny.+ci +W• it it 1 Iti i,t it
w =yw
it I i,t—1 it
Country a hi c p1
United Kingdom32.442 3.785 .393 .000 1.003 .745
(1668.4) (.232) (.071) (.002) (.171) (.089)
Germany —.858 —9.859 1.490 —.014 .682 .170
(.032) (.896) (.128) (.003) (.079) (.143)
Sweden —1.410 —3.915 .638 .017 .472 .212
(.018) (.310) (.072) (.010) (.081) (.147)
Canada 1.349 —1.356 —.005 —.011 .979 .088
(6.966) (.672) (.134) (.003) (.103) (.117)
United States 2.512 —.195 —.001 .074
(1.068) (.146) (.004) (.153)
=1.101
(.108)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 4
3SLS Estimation of Purchasing Power Parity























Monthly DataJuly 1973— December1979









(.191) (.020)Table 4 (continued)
Monthly Data January 1921 —May1925










Notes: The system of equations was estimated using the 3SLS
procedure on version 3.3 of TSP. The standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The starting values were obtained
from single equation 2SLS using FAIRS method, Table 1. The




U. =p.U+. itI i,t—1 it
Iv={c,TIME, TIME2, (nS1i), £n(p.i), i =1,...,4 or 5}
Quarterly Data 1973 III —1979IV
ENG 1.000
CER .662 1.000
SWE .510 .846 1.000




ITA .489 .627 1.000
SWE .492 .738 .503 1.000




ITA .203 .306 1.000
SWE .470 .311 —.022 1.000
JAP —.160 —.004 —.167 —.001 1.000
Notes:The correlation matrix was calculated from the estimated variance—
covariance matrix of the residuals. The corresponding parameter
estimates are given in Table 4.Table 6




Set Country a b •S2ep
Q—1970 United —.015 1.036 .163 *io2 .158 *i021.360
Kingdom (.065) (.084)
Germany -.143 .829 .271 *i02.274 *io_2 .892
(.114) (.132)
Sweden —.611 .569 .234 *io2 .203 *iO_22.956
(.255) (.179)
—3 — Canada —.005 1.008 .417 *10 .424 *10 .797
(.005) (.076)
-
M—1970 United .009 .993 .859 * .871 * .454
Kingdom (.027) (.035)
France —.069 .953 .905 * .911* .718
(.065) (.044)
Italy —.338 .948 .698 * .703*10 .772
(.293) (.045)
Sweden —.244 .828 .849 *10 .800 *103.369
(.094) (.066)
Japan —.143 .974 .991 *1O .997 * .746
(.130) (.023)Table 6 (continued)
M—1920 United .273 .863 .387 * .356 *1O33.270
Kingdom (.111) (.055)
France -.523 .603 .391 *io2.326 *io26.114
(.148) (.113)
Italy —.668 .502 .109 *iO.828 *i029340
(.157) (.116)
Sweden —.050 .940 .612 *l0.603 * 1.388
(.035) (.044)
Japan .095 .979 .886 * .913*10 .226
(.190) (.042)
Notes: Each equation was estimated by OLS. The coefficients and standard errors are
reported. Ô' is the maximum likelihood estimate of var(u),. under the null
hypothesis that (a., )= (0,].).S. is the variance of u under the al-
ternative hypothesis that (a ,b) (01). is the usual regression "F—
test." Notation is from Dickey and Fuller (1981). The 95% critical value
for n25 is 5.18, n =50is 4.86 and n =75is 4.71, where ri =numberof
observations (n=25for Q—1970, n =79for M—l970 and n53 for M—l920.)Table 7
Purchasing Power Parity —FirstDifferences
(Zn S —ZnSt_i) +[Zn (Pt/Pt*) —(Pt_i/Pt_i*)]+
Data
Set Country a D.W. ser
Q—1970 United .013 1.033 1.72 .191 .040
Kingdom (.011) (.443)
Germany .008 .504 2.06 .006 .054
(.017) (1.314)
Sweden .002 .445 2.06 .013 .050
(.010) (.816)
Canada —.005 1.068 1.47 .084 .021
(.004) (.734)
M—1970 United —.002 .044 1.78 .000 .028
Kingdom (.004) (.339)
France —.000 —.226 2.41 .001 .030
(.004) (.964)
Italy .003 1.235 2.14 .079 .027
(.004) (.485)
Sweden —.000 —.061 2.08 .000 .029
(.003) (.506)
Japan .001 .331 1.91 .014 .031
(.004) (.321)Table 7 (continued)
M—1920 United .001 .514 2.03 .169 .018
Kingdom (.003) (.161)
France .002 1.261 2.08 .343 .063
(.009) (.247)
Italy .005 1.303 2.05 .076 .106
(.015) (.643)
Sweden .004 .045 .98 .001 .020
(.003) (.175)
Japan —.003 .136 1.26 .029 .020
(.003) (.111)
Notes: Each equation was estimated by OLSQ. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.Table 8
3SLS Estimation of Purchasing Power Parity —FirstDifferences
(inSjt — a+1{in (P/P) —n
IV ={c,TINE, TIME2, (AinSj,, 1 1, .. .,N),(in
Country a (constrained)











Monthly Data July 1973 —December1979
























Notes: The system of equations was estimated using the 3SLS
procedure on Version 3.3 of TSP. The standard errors
are reported in parentheses. The starting values are
obtained from single equation OLS results.28
Table 9
Correlation Matrices
£nS —inS = cx+{in(p/P ) —£n(P/P ) +u it i,t—1 tit t—1i,t—1 it
iv ={C,TI,TI2,(ins,_1 —£nS1,t_2),
£n(Pt_2IP_2), i=l,...4 or 5}
Quarterly Data 1973 III —1979IV
ENG 1.000
GER .545 1.000
SWE .426 .856 1.000
CAN —.415 —.257 —.230 1.000
Monthly Data July 1973 —December1979
ENG 1.000
FRA .580 1.000
ITA .474 .661 1.000
SWE .513 .736 .565 1.000
JPN .426 .581 .446 .482 1.000
Monthly Data January 1921 —May1925
ENG 1.000
FRA .412 1.000
ITA .297 .253 1.000
SWE .611 .226 .187
JPN —.144 .004 —.007
1.000
.002 1.000
Notes:The correlation matrix was calculatedfrom the estimted variance—
covariance matrix of the residuals. The
corresponding parameter estimates are given in Table 8.Table 10
Purchasing Power Parity —Germanyas Base Country
£n= +Zn(P/P.t)+U.
uit=p.U. +E. 1 i,t—1 it
Iv ={c,TIME, TIME,2, nS1_i,
1973 III to 1979 IV
2
Country p R DW ser
United States .905 2.130 .400 .91 1.77 .044
(.018) (.219) (.183)
United Kingdom 1.652 .971 .654 .95 1.60 .043
(.034) (.136) (.151)
France —.619 1.015 .723 .91 1.77 .034
(.035) (.234) (.138)
Italy —5.650 1.198 .400 .96 1.95 .049
(.022) (.086) (.183)
Sweden —.498 1.518 .803 .98 1.53 .023
(.037) (.214) (.119)
Canada .922 2.693 .630 .94 1.90 .055
(.039) (.354) (.155)
Japan —5.138—3.340 .851 .18 1.90 .074
(.359) (3.392) (.105)
Notes: Each equation was estimated using FAIRs method. Standard errors in
parentheses.Table 11
Purchasing Power Parity —Germanyas Base Country
3SLS
= a.+ Zn (P/P.) +1it
pit
= +cit


















































Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Starting values for the
set of results were the final results from the first set of results.References
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